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WILL EXPLODING GuAINTIEs BOMB?
MARSHALL E. TRACHT
Springing and exploding guaranties - insider guaranties that will become due ifand
when a borrower files for bankruptcy - have become popular as "bankruptcy-proof-
ing" devices, yet there is little case law or literature on their enforceability. This article
reviews the limited existing law on these bankruptcy-contingent guaranties and exam-
ines some of the arguments against their enforceabiltiy that can be expected to be made
in the future.Over the past decade, we have seen the development and spread of a number
of "bankruptcy-proofing" techniques, many of which have not yet been
extensively tested in the courts. Among these devices are "springing" and
"exploding" guaranties, devices which have become common, yet have so far elicit-
ed relatively little analysis or critical scrutiny. The enforceability of these instru-
ments is an open question, and one that is likely to be hotly contested come the next
recession.
A springing guaranty is a guaranty of an enterprise's debt, given by an insider,
which will become effective only upon specified conditions.' Typically, those con-
ditions include the filing of a bankruptcy case by the borrower or failure to have any
involuntary bankruptcy case quickly dismissed. An exploding guaranty is the mir-
ror image, a guaranty that is in effect but will become void if the borrower cooper-
ates with the lender after any default. The effect is the same: The insider will be per-
sonally liable for the debt if the borrower contests the lender's rights or remedies, or
files a bankruptcy proceeding, after default. The insider will be free from liability if
the borrower "rolls over" and lets the lender enforce its remedies without a contest.2
These devices (hereinafter referred to as "bankruptcy-contingent guaranties")
were developed in the early 1990s and have rapidly become commonplace.
Although they raise difficult legal and policy issues, the strength of the economy
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through the 1990s has generally prevented lenders from having to enforce them, and
so there is, as of yet, little case law on their enforceability.
Bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are the clearest example of "pure-leverage
guaranties."N Their function is not to assure an additional means of repayment of
the debt should the borrower default. Rather, they ensure that the borrower will
make every effort to live up to its contractual promises and will not hamper the cred-
itor in its efforts to enforce its rights and recover its debt. Bankruptcy-contingent
guaranties are most widely used in three contexts. First, they may be used in financ-
ing for closely-held businesses, where a single or small number of shareholders,
members, or partners own and control the borrower. Second, they are used in com-
mercial real estate lending.' Third, they are increasingly common as an adjunct to
creating "bankruptcy remote" entities in securitized financing transactions.'
The challenges to bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are likely to come from
several different directions. There will be arguments that they are unenforceable as
a matter of state law because they violate public policy. They will be challenged in
bankruptcy cases, where debtors and guarantors will seek temporary and permanent
injunctions against their enforcement. These attacks will go beyond contesting the
guarantor's liability, as debtors seek to have lenders' claims equitably subordinated
on account of the leverage created by the guaranty. Although a comprehensive
examination of all possible objections is impossible in one article, this article reviews
the sparse case law on springing and exploding guaranties, then examines two of the
more significant arguments against their enforcement: that these instruments breach
the guarantor's the fiduciary duties, and that they violate bankruptcy policy.
THE CASE LAW
Only two reported cases address bankruptcy-contingent guaranties, each
involving a bankruptcy carve-out in a nonrecourse mortgage. In each case, the guar-
anty was found to be enforceable. Even so, there are substantial reasons to wonder
if these precedents will carry the day in future cases.
Consider first the Fourth Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Prince George Corp.7
After foreclosure, the FDIC sued a joint venturer for a deficiency judgment on the
joint venture's nonrecourse mortgage note. The nonrecourse clause had a carve-out
providing that the note would become recourse "to the extent that Holder's rights of
recourse to the property which is then subject to the Mortgage are suspended,
reduced, or impaired by or as a result of any act, omission or misrepresentation.. .or
by or as a result of any case, action, suit or proceeding to which [the borrower or any
other liable party] voluntarily becomes a party."' In essence, the carve-out was a
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springing guaranty by the joint venturers.
The district court held that the borrower's bankruptcy filing was an "act" trig-
gering liability under this provision, but for "policy reasons", the court declined to
hold that the borrower's actions in resisting the foreclosure itself gave rise to liabili-
ty.' The court stated that if the "lender intended to use the threat of a deficiency
judgment as an incentive to induce PGC to give up its right to defend against fore-
closure, such an extreme position should have been more clearly stated."" The dis-
trict court thus awarded damages based on the sixty-three days by which foreclosure
had been delayed by the borrower's bankruptcy filing."
On appeal, the guarantor argued that the borrower had a statutory right to
bankruptcy protection and that any waiver of that right was void on public policy
grounds." The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, noting that the contract "did
not prohibit PGC from resorting to bankruptcy; it merely provided that if PGC
took certain actions it would forfeit its exemption from liability for any deficiency."' 3
Moreover, the court held that the unambiguous language imposed deficiency liabil-
ity for "any act" that impaired the lender's recourse rights, language that includes the
borrower's defense of the foreclosure proceeding." The Fourth Circuit therefore
remanded for a determination of liability based on the delays caused by both the
bankruptcy case and the borrower's defense of the foreclosure action.
The second case that considers springing guaranties is similar. In First
Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 5 the debtor real estate partnership had
entered into a nonrecourse mortgage with a carve-out providing that the partners
would be individually liable should the partnership ever file for bankruptcy. After
default, the partnership filed for bankruptcy, although the case was later dismissed.
The lender then sued the partners, who argued that the bankruptcy-contingent lia-
bility was unenforceable under the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of ipso facto
clauses.'" The court rejected this argument on numerous grounds, including the
facts that the ipso facto prohibition applies only to executory contracts, not mort-
gages, and that once the bankruptcy cases had been dismissed, the enforceability of
the agreement was a matter of state law rather than bankruptcy law."1
While both of these cases enforced bankruptcy-contingent liabilities, they
should provide little comfort to lenders. In each case, the bankruptcy proceeding
had been dismissed prior to the initiation of the guaranty suit, making these poor
candidates to test the robustness of springing guaranties in the face of a strong bank-
ruptcy policy argument. Moreover, both decisions involved single-asset realty cases,
meaning that the borrowers had few, if any, creditors other than the mortgagee. As
a result, state law fiduciary duties that might have been owed to creditors were not
relevant either. In other words, these were the easy cases, to which the arguments




Perhaps the most obvious argument against springing and exploding guaranties
- on appropriate facts" - is that they are intended to create a conflict between the
guarantor's self-interest and the fiduciary duties owed to all of the borrower's credi-
tors as the borrower becomes insolvent.,, From this observation, it would seem only
a small step to the conclusion that bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are unenforce-
able. Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, and it is elementary contract law that an
agreement intended to induce the commission of a tort violates public policy and is
not enforceable.' This argument does not rely on the Bankruptcy Code or bank-
ruptcy policy. It simply asserts that a springing or exploding guaranty is not enforce-
able as a matter of state law.
This argument builds on the traditional view of the duties of corporate direc-
tors. Courts have routinely held that contracts limiting the ability of corporate
directors to exercise their independent judgment are unenforceable.' While this
argument is likely to prevail in some jurisdictions and with some types of debtors,
in others the case will be more difficult given the trend toward flexible or waivable
fiduciary duties. In New York, for example, the duty of loyalty does not prohibit
self-dealing by corporate directors if the personal interest is disclosed and approved
by the disinterested directors.22 Delaware has a similar provision.2 3
In the context of close corporations, courts have applied somewhat higher stan-
dards of loyalty as between majority and minority shareholders, given the position
of dependence that minority shareholders find themselves in.24 However, it is far
from clear that these higher standards will apply when courts consider the fiduciary
duties owed to the firm's creditors. And in some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, the
discretion of board members or managing shareholders in a close corporation may
be modified or controlled by written agreement of a majority of the shareholders.2 5
This trend toward waivable fiduciary duties is also apparent in recent statutory
enactments governing noncorporate business entities. For example, under the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995) and the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (1994), a partner's or manager's duty of loyalty may not be waived;
however, the partnership or operating agreement may "identify specific types or cat-
egories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unrea-
sonable."2 6 The Uniform Acts, of course, are not binding on the states, and some
states, most notably Delaware, have loosened the restrictions even further.27
The defense of contingent guaranties under this contractarian approach is sim-
ple enough. The question is whether the potential conflict is to be viewed from an
ex ante perspective, from which the "conflict" is a deliberate decision by the firm to
bind its managers to a particular approach to insolvency, or from an ex post per-
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spective, which examines the situation as a conflict of interest arising at the point of
insolvency. Viewed ex post, the decision to stay out of bankruptcy may be a breach
of the duty of loyalty - unless it was permissible for the parties to enter into a
defined modification of the duty of loyalty in specified future circumstances, where
that modification was in the firm's interest at the time it was executed. What looks
like a conflict of interest at the time of insolvency is really a process for bonding the
firm's decision makers to ensure that they will carry out those acts to which the enti-
ty has agreed, at the time of financing, in order to best advance its goals.
As a matter of corporate law (but not necessarily bankruptcy law), this argu-
ment has considerable merit. While some early cases held that a director could not
enter into a contract that could create a personal interest in conflict with the direc-
tor's fiduciary duty to the corporation,2 " this is no longer the prevailing law. In most
states today, a corporation may enter into a contract with a director if a disinterest-
ed quorum and voting majority of directors supports the transaction, or if the direc-
tor shows the fairness of the transaction. Conflicts are not per se impermissible, and
if appropriate disinterested parties (directors or a judge) ratify the transaction, there
is no violation.
Put in this light, bankruptcy-contingent guaranties seem unobjectionable. It is
hard to argue that an insider is taking advantage of the firm when he assumes the
risk of liability for the firm's debt in order to secure financing for the firm.2 9 As one
court has said in a different context, the fiduciary duty of a controlling shareholder
"does not require self-sacrifice."3M Thus, under modern standards of fiduciary duty,
it seems that a springing or exploding guaranty can be validated by vote of the board
(or members or partners, as the case may be) or by subsequent judicial ratification.
In some contexts, such as the LLC or partnership setting, the validation may occur
through provisions in the organizing documents.
There is a potent counter-argument, however. The fact that a manager's fidu-
ciary duties to other equity holders are contractually defined, modified, or waived
does not necessarily settle the extent of the fiduciary duties owed to creditors upon
insolvency. After all, the creditors were not parties to the modification provision,
nor are the equity holders or directors who ratified it the creditors' representatives.
Indeed, statutory provisions governing the modification of fiduciary duties in the
LLC and partnership contexts explicitly state that "the partnership [operating]
agreement may not...(10) restrict rights of third parties under this [Act]."' Even
under a contractarian approach to fiduciary duties, the manager may not be able to
enter into a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty, which attempts to modify the incen-
tives that will be faced by the manager at a future time when he or she will owe fidu-
ciary duties to creditors.32
At the very least, an insider subject to a springing guaranty faces a basic conflict
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of interest, and should therefore have to excuse herself from voting on whether the
borrower should file for bankruptcy. If the insider does not abstain, then the insid-
er could be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty absent a showing of the fairness
of the decision made.
BANKRUPTCY POLICY
Insider guaranties can help create appropriate incentives to keep firms from fil-
ing unwarranted bankruptcy cases." This is also the purpose of a bankruptcy-con-
tingent guaranty. It might even seem that the contingent guaranty, through its tai-
lored structure, would be superior to an unconditional guaranty. The bankruptcy-
contingent guaranty, however, is less accurate in its incentives than an uncondition-
al guaranty, creating an inappropriate overdeterrence. For this reason, bankruptcy-
contingent guaranties violate fundamental bankruptcy policies, and should be held
unenforceable.
Consider a hypothetical firm, with a liquidation value of $70 and a reorganiza-
tion value of $80. The firm has $100 in unsecured debt, $50 of which has been pro-
tected with a springing guaranty and $50 of which is not guarantied. Clearly the
firm should be reorganized, in which case creditors will lose only $20 rather than
$30. From the insider's perspective, however, the choice is between nonbankruptcy
liquidation with no personal liability, and bankruptcy reorganization with a person-
al liability of $10. 4 In other words, the incentives created by a bankruptcy-contin-
gent guaranty may prevent efficient bankruptcy filings.35
Moreover, there is reason to be concerned that waivers of post-default rights
may be entered into even when they are not, ex ante, efficient. Particularly where
these waivers are used to signal creditworthiness, as insider guaranties are, it is pos-
sible that borrowers will decline to ask for efficient terms for fear of labeling them-
selves as unworthy borrowers. 36 ' While this risk exists with bankruptcy waivers and
insider guaranties in general, the problem is exacerbated in the case of springing or
exploding guaranties: At least in the case of an outright waiver"7 or unconditional
guaranty, the insider has efficient incentives regarding the bankruptcy case. Once
the firm is in financial trouble the insider can be expected to negotiate with the
waiver holder to relinquish the waiver for some reasonable quidpro quo." In the case
of a springing guaranty, however, the insider's conflict usually means that there is no
one in a position to act on behalf of the creditor body in negotiating for a release of
the anti-bankruptcy provision. For this reason, bankruptcy-contingent guaranties
are more inimical to the goals of bankruptcy than a simple waiver of bankruptcy
rights which the debtor could seek to renegotiate without the in terrorem effect of
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the springing liability.
If springing guaranties violate fundamental bankruptcy policies - preventing
firms that would benefit from reorganization from filing and defeating the
Bankruptcy Code's ability to cure the collective action problem faced by creditors -
there is still the question of what legal doctrine, if any, a bankruptcy court could use
to bar enforcement of the contract. As shown above, it may be difficult to argue that
the guaranty is unenforceable under state law, and obligations that are binding
under state law are normally enforceable in bankruptcy.
However, a bankruptcy court could enjoin suit on a bankruptcy-contingent
guaranty using its general equitable powers under section 10 5.31 These powers are
limited to actions "necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of" the
Bankruptcy Code, so injunctive relief of this sort is not possible except insofar as it
is in aid of other specific bankruptcy provisions.o In the case of bankruptcy-con-
tingent guaranties, however, equitable relief is consistent with the policies and pro-
visions of the Code. For example, section 362 of the Code, the automatic stay,
enjoins creditor actions against the debtor or its property, but does not enjoin suits
against third parties.' Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly entered temporary
injunctions protecting third parties (such as insider guarantors) to carry out the
intent of the automatic stay.4 2 Similarly, Section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
generally invalidates ipso facto clauses, provisions that grant rights against the debtor
upon the filing of bankruptcy.4 3 This provision applies only to "an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease of the debtor," and thus would not invalidate a bankruptcy-
contingent guaranty.4 4 However, where a contract against a third party has the effect
of creating additional leverage over the debtor upon the filing of the bankruptcy
case, as a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty does, such a contract would seem to fall
within the intended functions of section 365(e).
In short, bankruptcy courts should be willing to invoke their authority under
section 105 to further the policies effectuated by sections 362 and 365(e)(1) by tem-
porarily enjoining suits on bankruptcy-contingent guaranties. The reasoning is con-
sistent with, but more persuasive than, cases in which bankruptcy courts have grant-
ed temporary injunctions against the enforcement of insider guaranties because
enforcement threatened the bankruptcy proceedings." The argument is more per-
suasive because of the inappropriate incentives created by the bankruptcy-contin-
gent nature of the liability.
A more difficult question will arise when the court must consider whether to
permit the bankruptcy-contingent liability not just to be temporarily stayed during
the bankruptcy case, but to be discharged pursuant to a bankruptcy plan. 6
Assuming that such injunctions are not barred by Bankruptcy Code section 52 4 (e),
a matter on which courts are split,7 should a permanent injunction be permitted
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over the objection of a creditor holding a bankruptcy contingent guaranty? Even in
those courts that permit them, permanent injunctions protecting third parties are
viewed as extraordinary relief requiring unusually powerful justifications."
However, a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty is not, at its core, an obligation of a
third party or a contract of financial assurance; it is a bonding device used to con-
trol the business decisions of the debtor, with financial liability imposed on the prin-
cipals as a penalty for breach. 9 As such, it is appropriate for a bankruptcy court to
enjoin enforcement as part of a reorganization plan.
Although the springing guaranties were enforced in Prince George and
Brookhaven Realty, these cases are consistent with the arguments advanced here. In
each case, the debtor had no real prospect of reorganizing and the bankruptcy case
had been quickly dismissed prior to the state law suit seeking to impose personal lia-
bility. As the court noted in Brookhaven Realty, "The policies of providing a debtor
with a fresh start and an opportunity to reorganize its finances are not present in a
foreclosure proceeding.""o
CONCLUSION
Springing and exploding guaranties are clever devices, attempting to do by indi-
rection what has been forbidden by direct means - if the right to file for bank-
ruptcy cannot be waived, at least the exercise of that right can be made painful. And
what little case law exists seems to support the effectiveness of these instruments.
However, we have not yet seen a case where a bankruptcy court, rather than a state
court, has been asked to rule on the enforceability of a springing guaranty or to grant
an injunction barring its enforcement in order to protect the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Nor have we seen a case where a viable business is threatened by the effects of
a bankruptcy-contingent guaranty, or the interests of legitimate third-party creditors
have been put at risk. It remains to be seen whether, given a viable debtor or harm
to third-parties, a court would permit a springing or exploding guaranty to stand.
NOTES
' For sample documents, see William L. Norton, Jr., Bankruptcy L. & Prac. (2d ed.), Form § 1111:2 (non-recourse
provision with carve-out for bankruptcy proceedings); Lester M. Bliwise, Mortgage Lending Documentation,
Attachment C ("Model Springing Guaranty"), in Commercial Real Estate Financing 9, 61 (PLI Real Est. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4603, 1997) (although entitled a "Springing Guaranty," this is actually a
terminable or "exploding" guaranty); Sidney A. Keyles, Couneling the Client on Springing and Exploding Guaranties
(with Forms), 12 Prac. Real Est. Law. 29 (Nov. 1996); Michael T. Madison and Jeffry I Dwyer, The Law ofReal
Etate Finaning (rev. ed. 1996), Forms 14.2 ("Guaranty: Springing") and 14.3 ("Guaranty Agreement: Exploding");
Joshua Stein, Lenderi Model State-of-the-Art Nonrecourse Clause (with Carveouts), 43 Prac. Law. 31 (1997).
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The same effect can be created in nonrecourse loans by creating a "carve-out" from the nonrecourse provisions. See,
e.g., Alan Wayre, Non-Recourse Clause, reprintedin Modern Real Estate Transactions 1575, 1585-86 (ALI-ABA
Resource Materials, II ed. 1996) which provides in relevant part:
(d) Notwithstanding the limitation of liability in subsection (a) above, Borrower shall be fully personally liable for
all of Borrower's obligations under the Loan Documents, and Lender's recourse to the personal assets of Borrower
and its constituent partners shall not be limited in any way by this Section X, if Borrower (A) attempts to prevent
or delay the foreclosure of the Mortgage or any other collateral for the Loan or the exercise of any of lender's other
remedies under any Loan Document, or (B) claims that any Loan Document is invalid or unenforceable and such a
claims [sic] will have the effect of preventing or delaying such foreclosure or any other exercise of remedies.
Without limitation, Borrower shall be deemed to have attempted to prevent or delay such foreclosure or other exer-
cise of remedies if (i) Borrower files a petition under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101 etseq.
(the "Bankruptcy Code), as amended, (ii) Borrower opposes a motion by Lender to lift an automatic stay imposed
pursuant to II U.S.C. § 362 and for leave to foreclose the Mortgage and any other collateral for the Loan, or (iii)
Borrower files a proposed plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code under which Lender would receive (x)
less than all of the Property or (y) a lien encumbering less than all of the Property or (z) a lien having a lower prior-
ity or terms less favorable to Lender than the Mortgage as it existed immediately prior to the filing of a petition
under the Bankruptcy Code....
While conversations with practitioners confirm that bankruptcy-contingent guaranties are now a standard part of
commercial transactions, there is no real data on the prevalence of these devices. Indeed, to the extent a bankruptcy-
contingent guaranty serves its purpose, there never will be a judicial record of its existence. Some indication of the
growth of the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty may be found in the secondary literature. There are no references to
springing or exploding guaranties in the WESTLAW TP-ALL database (all texts and periodicals) prior to 1996; four
in 1996; six in 1997; eleven in 1998; thirteen in 1999; and ten in the first half of 2000. Only in the last three or four
years have form books started including bankruptcy-contingent guaranties. See sources cited supra note 1.
The term is borrowed from Professor Jay Westbrook, but note an important difference from the context in which he
used it B to refer to any insider guarantee from a guarantor who is "not likely to be able to offset any shortfall in the
debtor's performance." See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 80
(1991). Here, the point is that, regardless of whether the guarantor is solvent, the entire purpose of the guaranty is to
control behavior rather than to provide additional financial resources.
5 See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Nonrecourse Carveouts: How Far is Far Enough?, Real Est. Rev. (Summer 1997); Russell L.
Munsch, et al., The Changing Commercial Real Estate Environment -Are Commercial Real Estate Workouts Dead?,
(Dallas Bar Ass'n, Nov. 5, 1997), ("The standardization of commercial real estate loan documentation nationwide, as
well as structured impediments to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and bankruptcy cases (including the
proliferation of 'springing guaranties'), may adversely impact upon the willingness or ability of commercial real estate
owners to seek the protection of these forums."); Kenneth M. Block & Jeffery B. Steiner, Stays ofSpringing
Guaranties' How Creditor Can Enforce Rights Against Non-Debtor Guarantor, N.Y L.J., July 17, 1996, at 5 (stating that
springing guaranties "are common in real estate loans and financings").
* See, e.g., Frederick Z. Lodge, et al., Bankruptcy Remote Structures in Mortgage Loans, Prob. Prop., June 10, 1996,
49.
7 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id at 1044.
See id at 1045.
Id. at 1047.
See id
See id. at 1046.
"Id
4 See id. at 1048.
" 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 36 5(e), which invalidates lease or contract clauses under which "a right or obligation [is] terminat-
ed or modified.. solely because of" insolvency or bankruptcy.
" See Brookhaven Realty 637 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
" This argument is factually inapposite in single asset real estate cases like 1rince George Corp. and Brookhaven Realty
where there are few, if any, creditors other than the mortgage lender asserting the guaranty liability.
" The directors of a solvent corporation owe their fiduciary duties (duties of loyalty and of care) to the corporations
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shareholders, and owe creditors only the contractual duties that have been agreed to by the parties. However, as a
company approaches insolvency, the directors may come to owe a fiduciary duty to creditors as well, See, e.g., Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("[where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not mere-
ly the agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise" as a whole, rather than any
single group of stakeholders.). And those duties may shift entirely to creditors once the firm is insolvent. See, e.g.,
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Collie v. Becknell, 762 P2d 727 (Colo. App.
1988); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 Cal. App. 3d 558, 177 Cal. Rptr. 495 (506) (4th Dist. 1981); Oficial Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors ofBuckheadAm. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead A. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956
(Bankr. D. Del. 1994); Miramar Resources, Inc. v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); FDIC
v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983). Once a company becomes
a debtor in possession in a bankruptcy reorganization case, management owes its fiduciary duties to the estate, rather
than to any particular constituency. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commn v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355
(1985) ("[the fiduciary duty of a trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors."); In re Central Ice Cream Co.,
836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (arguing that debtor-in-possession has duty "to maximize the value of the estate,
not of a particular group of claimants.").
This pattern is commonly explained by considering who holds the "residual interest" in the firm. See, e.g., Steven
L. Schwartz, Rethinking a Corporations Obligations to Creditors, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 647, 667-68 (1996); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 67-70 (1991); Christopher W. Frost,
Running The Asylum: Governance Problens in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 89, 114-15 (1992);
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23 (1991). In other words, fiduciary duties are owed to the parties who
will be affected by a marginal profit or loss, thereby creating an incentive to make economically efficient decisions. If
the firm is solvent, creditors will receive their contractually fixed payments, and additional profits or losses will accrue
to the shareholders. Once the firm becomes insolvent, creditors will receive only part of their claims, and additional
profits or losses will increase or decrease the payments to these creditors. Thus, the directors' fiduciary duties run to
the creditors upon insolvency because they become the residual claimants, the parties who stand to gain or lose based
on the decisions made by management.
2 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 192 ("A promise to commit a tort or to induce the commission of a tort
is unenforceable on grounds of public policy."). A related argument that could be made, yet would likely fail, is that
the threat to exercise a springing guaranty violates a fiduciary duty owed by the lender. While it is generally true that
a lender owes no fiduciary duties to its borrowers, to the extent that a creditor is able to exercise control over a partic-
ular decision made by a debtor's board of directors, the creditor may be found to have fiduciary duties with regard to
that decision. See, e.g., Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics), 29 B.R. 139, 170-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y
1983) ("The general rule that a creditor is not a fiduciary of his debtor is not without exception. In the rare circum-
stance where a creditor exercises such control over the decisionmaking processes of the debtor as amounts to a domi-
nation of its will, he may be held accountable for his actions under a fiduciary standard.").
" See, e.g., 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporation § 1487 ("A contract by a director of a corporation that limits or restricts him
in the free exercise of his judgment or discretion, or that places him under direct and powerful inducements to dire-
gard his duties to the corporation, its creditors, and other stockholders in the management of corporate affairs, is
against public policy and void.") (Citing cases); William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers
and Directors § 4-20 (5th ed. 1993) (citing cases).
22 See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(b) (McKinney 1986).
23 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
24 See Kathleen D. Fuentes, Comment, Limited Liability Companies and Opting-Out ofLiability: A New Standard for
Fiduciary Duties?, 27 Secon Hall L Rev. 1023, 1043-46 (1997).
" See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 5§ 350-354.
' § 103(b)(2)(i) (1995); Revised Uniform Partnership Act (R.U.P.A) § 103(b)(3)(i) (11997). Similarly, the acts pro-
vide that the operating agreement may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care", § 103(b)(3) (1995) and 10(b)(4)
(1997), nor "eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing ...but the [operating agreement or partnership
agreement] may determine the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the stan-
dards are not manifestly unreasonable." ULLCA § 103(b)(4)(1975); R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(5)(1997).
" See Del. Code § 18-1 l01(c) ("To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has
duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liability company or to another member
or manager.. .(2) the member's or manager's or other persons duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by
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provisions in a limited liability company agreement.").
a See James D. Cox, et al., Corporations, § 10.12-14.
" Most cases addressing conflict of interest situations involve a fiduciary dealing with the corporation in a manner
that results in a personal benefit for the fiduciary. Thus, cases on the corporate opportunity doctrine or excess com-
pensation or self-dealing are commonplace. In the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty context, however, the insider does
not gain at the expense of the corporation by entering into the guaranty; thus, most of the existing case law seems
inapposite. The closest analogy is to cases that address whether it is a breach of fiduciary duty for an insider to cause
an insolvent corporation to make payments on a debt owed to, or guarantied by, the insider. See John C. McCoid,
Corporate Preferences to Insiders, 43 S.C. L. Rev. 805, at 816-21 (1992) (discussing cases that have addressed whether
such payments are constructively fraudulent or reversible on "equity" grounds). At least these cases present situations
where an insider entered into a contract from which the insider could only lose in order to benefit the corporation.
Courts have held that later actions taken to mitigate the insider's loss, at the expense of other creditors, could be a
breach of fiduciary duties. Bankruptcy-contingent guaranties would seem to pose an even stronger case for condem-
nation. The insider preference cases concern a question that is purely distributional (which creditors will be paid
from a given pool of assets), while the bankruptcy-contingent guaranty may prevent the firm from maximizing its
assets, distributional questions aside.
" Getty Oil v. Skely Oil Co, 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. 1970).
3 R.U.PA § 103(b)(10) (1996); U.L.L.CA. § 103(b)(7) (1996).
'2 I am not addressing the fiduciary duties of the manager of the debtor in possession after a bankruptcy filing, which
are a matter of bankruptcy law, and presumably cannot be modified by a pre-bankruptcy contractual arrangement.
Moreover, the argument against springing and exploding guaranties is not that they subvert the management of the
bankruptcy case because once the guarantor has "bitten the bullet" and caused the borrower to file for bankruptcy, the
guaranty, if enforceable, is indistinguishable from an ordinary insider guaranty. The threat from contingent guaranties
exists before any bankruptcy filing - the threat is that the bankruptcy case will never be initiated.
" An insider who has guarantied the firms debt will be less likely to file a hopeless bankruptcy case because the losses
sustained during the proceeding will increase the liability on the guaranty.
. One half of the $80 reorganization value, or $40, will be applied to the $50 in guarantied debt.
" Note that this same disincentive does not exist when the insider has entered into an unconditional guaranty. The
choice would then be between nonbankruptcy liquidation, which would result in personal liability for a $15 deficien-
cy ($50 owed to the guarantied creditor, less $35 share of liquidation value), and a bankruptcy reorganization with
personal liability of just $10 ($50 guarantied debt less $40 share of the reorganized firm). Note as well that the provi-
sion at issue in Prince George Corp. avoided the perverse incentives attendant on many springing guaranties, because it
imposed deficiency liability only "to the extent" that prohibited acts impaired the FDIC's recourse to its collateral. 58
E3d at 1044. Thus, the damages were measured by the interest lost and expenses incurred directly from the borrow-
er's acts. Id. This is dramatically different - and far more defensible - in its effects from a provision that would
make the borrower's principals liable for the entire deficiency, regardless of the actual harm caused by the borrower's
resistance.
' See Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equiry of Redernption, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 599,
636-41 (1999).
" Although I have argued for the enforceability of bankruptcy waivers, I am not optimistic that courts will adopt this
position. See Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Iractice, and Lao 92 Cornell L.
Rev. 301(1997). Accordingly, throughout this analysis I assume that waivers of the right to file for bankruptcy are
void on "public policy" grounds. Nonetheless, even if courts determine that bankruptcy waivers are enforceable, for
the reasons expressed in this paragraph I believe that springing and exploding guaranties are suspect.
' See id at 330.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides, in relevant part: "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
' See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ablers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that authority under section 105 is lim-
ited because "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the
confines of the Bankruptcy Code.").
See, e.g., Credit Aliance Corp. v. Williasn, 851 E2d 119 (4th Cit. 1988)
It generally has been held that bankruptcy courts have the power to temporarily enjoin suits against third parties,
such as guarantors, where the injunction is necessary to facilitate the reorganization. Cases in which such injunctions
have been granted to protect insider guarantors include: In re Third Eighty-Ninth Assocs., 138 B.R 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Lirchfield Co. of S.C L.P o. Anchor Bank (In re Litchfield Co. ofS.C Ltd Partnership), 135 BR. 797
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(W.D.N.C. 1992); In re Lomas Fin Corp., 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); First Federal Say. &Loan Assn. ofLittle Rock
v. Pettit, 12 B.R. 147 (E.D. Ark. 1981); In re ET.L., Inc., 152 B.R. 61 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1993); Codfsh Corp. v. FDIC
(In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1988): In re KasualKreations, 54 BR. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985);
In re Northlake Bldg Partners, 41 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984). For discussions of the temporary injunction issue,
see Paul H. Deutch, Note, Expanding the Automatic Stay: Protecting Nondebtors in Single Asset Bankruptcy Cases, 2 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 453 (1994); G.H. Ishii-Chang, Litigation and Bankruptcy: The Dilemma ofthe Codefendant Stay
63 Am. Bankr. L.J. 257 (1989); Elizabeth H. Winchester, Note, Expanding the Bankruptcy Code: The Use ofSection
362 and Section 105 to Protect Solvent Executives of Debtor Corporations, 58 Brooklyn L. Rev. 929 (1992).
" See II U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(1986).
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1986).
See supra cases cited at note 42.
6 A related question is whether a permanent injunction should be granted if the bankruptcy of the borrower does not
result in a confirmed plan of reorganization. If the bankruptcy case is converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed, that is a
strong indication that the filing was inefficient, and it does not seem to threaten B and indeed may support B bank-
ruptcy policy to enforce personal liability triggered by the inappropriate recourse to bankruptcy. (This is consistent
with the decisions in Prince George and Brookhaven.) However, conversion or dismissal does not prove the case should
not have been filed or even that the case did not benefit creditors. Moreover, given the uncertainty of any bankruptcy
case, the risk ofsuch liability would deter some efficient cases. The distorted incentive created by the bankruptcy-
contingent liability argues for their outright prohibition, and so relief should be available to the guarantor even absent
confirmation of a reorganization plan. The appropriate limitation on release of a bankruptcy-contingent liability
should not be whether or not a plan is confirmed, but whether the case was filed in good faith. Courts have properly
held that a bankruptcy case filed simply in order to protect guarantors is filed in bad faith. See, e.g., In re Humble
Place foint Venture, 836 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1991); In reNorth Vermont Associates, L.P, 165 B.R. 340 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1994). Again, this appears largely consistent with Prince George and Brookhaven, situations in which the bankruptcy
cases were quickly dismissed. It seems appropriate for state courts to leave discharge of the liability up to the bank-
ruptcy court, which is in a much better position to determine whether the petition was filed in good Faith.
" The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have rejected the authority of the bankruptcy courts to permanently enjoin actions
against third parties (effectively discharging the third parties' obligations), relying largely on section 524(e), which
provides: "Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the
liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." II U.S.C. § 524(c). See Resorts
Intl v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cit. 1995); American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit
Corp. (In re American Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); Underhill v. Royal 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cit.
1985); see also Landting Diverssified Properties-II v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund), 922
E2d 592, 601-02 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that section 524(e) prohibits discharge of third party). Most courts and
commentators disagree. See, e.g., Feld v. Zae Corp. (In re Zae Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy court
has "related to" jurisdiction over creditors' suits against debtor's insurer, but lacks power to permanently enjoin such
suits); In re Specialty Equip. Inc. 3 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating, in dicta, that while section 524(e) provides
that the discharge does not release third parties, it "does not purport to limit or restrain the power of the bankruptcy
court to otherwise grant a release to a third party"); SEC n. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 E2d 285, 293 (2d Cit. 1992) ("In bankruptcy cases, a court may enjoin a credi-
tor from suing a third party, provided the injunction plays an important part in the debtor's reorganization plan." (cit-
ingA.H. Robins)); MacArthur Co. v.Johns-Manville Corp. (In rJohns-Manville Corp.), 837 E2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988);
Menard Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H Robins Co., Inc.), 880 F2d 694 (4th Cit. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989); In re AOVIndus., Inc. 792 E2d 1140 (D.C. Cit. 1986); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray (In or Monarch
Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert and
Rothwell 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992); see generally Hydee Feldstein, Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code §524(e)
22 Cal. Bankr. J. 25 (1994); Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out offail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to
Release Nondebror Parties, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that section 105 does not authorize bankruptcy
courts to enjoin actions against third parties).
Even if such permanent injunctions are within the power of the bankruptcy court, this power is seldom if ever
used to protect guarantors. Cases decline to confirm reorganization plans on the grounds that they impermissibly pur-
ported to release the liability of third party guarantors or codebtors. See American Hardwoods Inc. v. Deutsche Credit
Corp, (In re American Hardwoods), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cit. 1989); In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610
(9th Cir. BAP 1990); In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Bennett Paper
Corp., 65 B.R. 518 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986); Bill Roderick Distrib. Inc. v. A.]. Mackay Co. (In reA.. Mackay Co.), 50
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B.R. 756 (D. Utah 1985). In the only case I have been able to find in which the bankruptcy court may (the published
appellate decision is unclear) have confirmed such a plan over the timely objection of a creditor, the order was
reversed on appeal. See Mellon Bank is MK Siegel 96 B.R. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
For analysis of the propriety of permanently enjoining actions against third parties, see Ralph Brubaker,
Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal ofiNon-Debror Releases in Chapter II
Reorganizations, 1997 U. Ill. L Rev. 959; Meltzer, supra; Hydee Feldstein, Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code § 524(e) 22
Cal. Bankr. J. 25 (1994); Kenneth M. Lewis, When are Nondebrors Really Entitled to a Discharge. Setting the Record
Straight onjohns-Manville andA.H. Robins, 3 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 163 (1994); Judith R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court
furisdiction to Release Insiders from Crdiror Claim in Corporate Reorganizations, 9 Bankr. Dev. J. 485 (1993); Howard
C. Buschmann III & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety ofBankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between
Nondebors, 47 Bus. Law. 913 (1992).
* Such injunctions have been permitted primarily when the injunction was necessary to the reorganization. In those
cases, the creditor(s) being enjoined were to receive payment in full under the plan of reorganization, and the vast
majority of creditor(s) being enjoined consented to the injunction. See In re Master Mortgage lnv. Fund Inc., 168
B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (gathering and discussing cases).
*I use the word "penalty" carefully here to distinguish from "damages." The principal objection to the bankruptcy-
contingent guaranty is that the liability is not measured by the loss occasioned by the bankruptcy filing itself.
0 637 N.YS.2d 418, 421 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996)
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